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Alan C. Cairns* The Canadian Constitutional
Experiment
I. Introduction
Amidst the staggering array of possible foci for an essay on the
Canadian constitutional experiment I have chosen to stress the
recent tumultuous struggles for identity and community which have
engaged citizens and governments. My perspective is primarily
from the bottom up, not because the recent constitutional exercise
shows the Canadian peoples as masters of their fate, which it does
not, but because who we are and to whom we relate as fellow
citizens are important subjects in themselves. Further, the
contemporary democratic state cannot function successfully in a
vacuum. Its weight and its pressure are such, and its purposes are so
intrusive of society, that what we now have is a state-society fusion
in which a positive symbiosis between the two is a functional
necessity. Otherwise the state will fall into disrepute and disrepair
as it faces an indifferent populace. State purposes now require so
much popular support and participation if they are to succeed that
we have no alternative but to move in the direction of a more
participant citizenry, which shares on a day to day basis in the task
of governing itself. Thus the community towards which we work is
a political community which simultaneously links us with each
other and reduces the distance and the differentiation between the
governors and the governed.
The first issue to be addressed is our complex evolution as a
people. The political identities and boundaries of community which
satisfied our grandparents are gone forever. We have been
progressively set adrift from our former selves and we need to find a
new resting place with meanings which we can all share, which
contains and accommodates our rampaging diversities in a
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framework of tolerance and civility, and which recognizes that older
definitions of nations will no longer work. The world is too much
with us, constantly washing over us with waves of interdependence,
for us to choose anything other than a non-exclusive partial
distinctiveness which attaches us simultaneously to Canada and to
mankind.
My task, therefore, is to answer the questions of where we have
come from, and who we are now as a people, thrown together in a
common space, subject to the same political system, but with our
historical senses of identity and community shattered by jolts of
change we did not seek. Can we respond with vision to the urgent
task of making moral sense of our collective existence? Can that
vision of community extend to the creation of more effective
participatory links between the citizens and the governments of
Canadian federalism?
II. The Decline of Britishness and The Fragmentation of
Community and Identity
The definition of who we are as a people has been a moving target
for the last half century. The federal state and Canadian society have
been caught up in a vortex of pressures between new identities
emerging from below and struggling for recognition, and
manipulatory government attempts from above to refashion
collectivities in the light of state purposes. The transformations in
political identity and conceptions of community since the Second
World War have already been immense, but the end is not yet in
sight.
The prevailing definition up to World War II of Canada as a
British country - with a French Canadian minority concentrated in
Quebec, little concerned with the positive use of provincial state
power, and excluded from all but token and symbolic representation
in the federal political elite and the bureaucracy - has been
relegated to the museum. The declining psychological significance
of Britishness to the Canadian identity is a consequence of the
reduced British role in world affairs, the transformation of the
Empire into a diluted multi-racial Commonwealth no longer bound
by common allegiance to Westminster political traditions, and of
the diminished British interest in Canada as British attention shifted
to Europe.
The ending of psychological tutelage to the Mother country,
proudly described as the move from colony to nation by liberal
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nationalist historians, left Canadians with the task of fashioning a
more autonomous identity. For a heady but ephemeral interlude the
post-war international role of Canada seemed to promise a new and
pleasing definition of the country as a middle power whose
international significance could provide a satisfying external role
while an emerging domestic heterogeneity worked itself out. That
interlude ended with the post-war recovery of Europe, the explosion
of third world states and the relegation of Canada to a lower position
in the international pecking order.
Domestic pressures emanating from a no longer quiescent
Quebec further undermined the continued vitality of a British,
Anglophone definition of Canada. Concurrent with this phenome-
non was a more general ethnic assertiveness outside the two
founding nations. The pan-Canadianism of Diefenbaker and the
Diefenbaker Bill of Rights were responses to the latter; the dualist
emphasis of the Liberals, leading to linguistic reconstruction of the
federal bureaucracy and the new prominence of Francophone
cabinet ministers, were the first stages of an on-going response to
the former. Since then, dualism and multiculturalism, which are not
easily compatible, have diminished the Anglophone role in the
collective image of Canadian society. Britishness is now only one of
the images and traditions in an increasingly variegated and unstable
blend of linguistic duality, ethnic pluralism, and social
heterogeneity.
The declining Britishness of Canada is also reflected in shifts in
the external political models to which we look for guidance. The
diminished significance of Britain as a constitutional reference was
strikingly evident in the recent constitutional debate. Symptomatic
of that erosion was the inability and unwillingness of all but a few to
defend the British virtues of parliamentary supremacy against the
non-British, almost un-British practice of rights to the people. To a
previous generation Sterling Lyon's defence of parliamentary
supremacy would have seemed platitudinous and central to the
derivative Canadian tradition, rather than a defensive last gasp of
support for yesterday's verities, which earned him the label of
redneck.
The constitution has grown away from its British roots, not just
by the Americanism of the Charter, or by the final ending of the
Westminster role in the amending process, but by the more general
opening up of Canadians to the constitutional experience of other
countries. The Westminster model has seemed of limited relevance
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to the problems of federalism which have dominated our agenda in
recent decades.
Canadian political elites and academic analysts underwent a
recent crash course in comparative government as they ransacked
the globe for ideas and institutional suggestions appropriate to the
Canadian setting. A Senatorial mission visited Australia to explore
the possible utility of an elected Senate for Canada. The British
Columbia government's constitutional proposals for Senate reform
were inspired by the German Bundesrat, after on-the-spot study of
German and Swiss experience. The search for a proportional
representation system which might be employed to generate a more
regionally balanced party system resulted in a canvass of
Continental European, not British, experience where such systems
are commonly employed. Finally, in a startling reversal of the
historic Canadian attitude of superiority to American political and
constitutional practices, the American Congressional system is now
often viewed positively. We no longer confidently and automati-
cally consider the fusion of executive and legislative power and the
strength of party discipline in the Canadian system to be superior to
the American separation of powers and the greater freedom enjoyed
by members of Congress.
The concurrent and related decline of the Britishness of our
constitutional tradition and of our basic identities has been
accompanied, in both cases, by an internationalization of the forces
and ideas feeding into our constitutional system and to our self
conceptions. Put differently, our particular Canadian past has a
diminished hold on us as the contemporary world external to our
border increasingly pervades our consciousness.
Our openness to the practices and experiences of the outside
world is everywhere apparent. The aboriginal peoples who can
claim a prescriptive right to privileged treatment as the first
Canadians, are deeply frustrated by their low socio-economic
status. They are fortified in their demands by various aboriginal
international organizations which meet periodically for conscious-
ness raising, the exchange of political information and the
generation of cross-national solidarities. Additional demands for
equitable treatment are raised by the growing communities of
non-white immigrants who reject white supremacy in all its forms,
and whose emerging political importance is revealed by the
existence of a House of Commons Special Committee now holding
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hearings on the Participation of Visible Minorities in Canadian
Society.
The group pressures for recognition and for the redefinition of
Canadianism do not stop here. The profound and powerful demands
of the women's movement for a non-sexist society is a socio-
political phenomenon immensely challenging to the status quo.
They too feed on international roots. Finally, the explosion of
alternative life-styles born of the sexual revolution in the western
world elicits domestic claims for non-discriminatory treatment by
lesbians, gays, single parents and co-vivanting couples.
This bewildering procession of diverse demands for recognition
is accompanied by the emergence into popular consciousness of
group labels - Qu6b6cois, Inuit, Dene, Aboriginal Peoples, Gays
and Lesbians - which were unknown to our grandparents but
which are now part of popular discourse. The political significance
of these identity transformations is not trivial, for they all result in
claims on the state for recognition, for fair treatment, often for
affirmative action, and for representation in the governing councils
of the nation. Their successful accommodation into a new pluralist
and integrated understanding of what it means to be a Canadian will
not be easy, for each typically seeks a supportive use of state power,
either to accelerate their movement to equality of status, or to
provide temporary or permanent privileged treatment as compensa-
tion for past injustices.
These issues of identity and group rights may seem far removed
from discussion of the health of that abstraction called the Canadian
constitutional system, but they are not. To the extent they do not
elicit positive responses, the citizen base of political authority will
be fragmented and unstable. On the other hand, a maladroit
response to the proliferating claims for recognition and group rights
could result in a rigidified society of exclusive and often ascriptive
group identities stressing the parts at the expense of the whole. The
increasing use of the word nation - the Dene nation, the Inuit
Nation, the Indian Nation of First Peoples, and the Quebec nation
capped by the state of Quebec - is a key indicator of escalating
group identities for which the comfortable label of 'mosaic' is too
insipid to be appropriate.
Since the satisfaction of these group claims typically involves
refashioning and restricting the identities of others, as well as
increasing the competition for public and private goods in
circumstances in which not all can be winners, they are initially
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divisive in their impact. From the perspective of society and the
state, therefore, these emergent group identities are not without
their costs and ambiguities. The emphasis on dualism based on
charter groups of British and French descent, for example, was not
received with acclaim by the various Third Force groups, especially
in western Canada, who saw themselves as relegated to a second
class citizen status. Ottawa responded with its policy of
multiculturalism, indicating the troubling tendency for each
response to generate new sets of claims and a further set of
responses.
For political authorities, these fissiparous tendencies, whatever
their justification and sociological explanation, immensely compli-
cate the state's task in generating consent and legitimacy. The
psychic integration of these mushrooming diversities into a common
harmonious Canadianism is one of the central contemporary
challenges facing the Canadian federal state. The failure of the state
to meet this challenge will not leave the populace unmoved. We will
be left floundering if no overarching sense of community emerges.
The response to the societal fragmentation just described was,
and is, conditioned by our political fragmentation. Concurrent with
the developing fragmentation of community deriving from both
domestic and international forces, the federal and provincial
governments were engaged in often competing attempts to
restructure the contours of community and identity for their own
purposes.
III. Federalism and the Fragmentation of Community
Nothing in the three decades from the stock market crash of 1929 to
the assumption of office in Quebec by Jean Lesage in 1960 prepared
Canadians for the nature of the debate which has periodically
convulsed the country in the last quarter of a century. The class
focussed debate on the inequities of capitalism, for which we had
been waiting since the thirties, never happened. As late as the
mid-1960s leading scholars continued to predict the demise of the
provinces. Others predicted and hoped that a creative, country-wide
class politics organized by a simplified two-party system -
conservative versus democratic socialist - would break through the
anachronistic barriers of a fossilized federal system. That system, it
was held, sustained an irrelevant debate which exaggerated the
significance of regionalism/provincialism. In the economic deter-
minism of this analysis, capitalism and technological change were
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to be the dynamic agents. The class system would provide the
relevant cleavages, and a new party system based on those
cleavages would moderate the injustices of an economy based on
the profit principle. Implicit in this perspective was the assumption
that economic change had made us one people and that accordingly
the central government was to be the ultimate and clearly dominant
master of our collective fates. Neither provincial governments nor
the sentiments of provincialism on which they allegedly were based
were accorded any prominence in such analyses, except in the form
of a scarcely concealed irritation at their inexplicable and too long
delayed departure from the Canadian scene.
To explore the events which led to the unravelling of this vision,
which was not without a certain nobleness of purpose, would be to
write the history of the past half century, a task which limitations of
time and space thankfully preclude. Briefly, however, the
explanation is found at the intersection of two phenomena, the
unpredicted quiescence and intellectual disorganization and weak-
ness of the left, and the equally unpredicted growth of a positive
state-centered nationalism in Quebec, which, in conjunction with a
resurgent government-led provincialism in much of the rest of
Canada, shattered the centralist federal framework we had been
bequeathed by World War II.
Consequently, our controversies have been about federalism and
the boundaries of community, not about the class system and the
injustices of capitalism. For two decades our most vigorous public
debates have sought answers to the pre-eminently political questions
of who we are as a people and what constitutional framework is
appropriate for a harmonious future co-existence of our national and
provincial selves.
The debate was not a derivative of other issues. It was not a mask
for a debate which was really about the role of the state in the
economy - although the question of which state has clearly been
central - nor, to put it slightly differently, was it a debate in which
economic actors behind the scenes manipulated political puppets
whose language concealed the real goals and purposes of competing
economic interests. The debate was what it professed to be on the
surface. It was a political debate about those political issues central
to our existence - how our federal and provincial selves could be
reconciled at the level of community and at the level of government.
The debate transformed our understanding of federalism. Since
the depression of the thirties the division of powers had been viewed
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as the essence of Canadian federalism. Debate about constitutional
change was directed to jurisdictional questions, and it was a
pervasive assumption that the provincial level was the outlet for
provincial concerns. By contrast, national politics, focussing on the
central government, was seen as an arena where Canadians debated
their future as Canadians, where they analyzed problems as a single
people and focussed on their national existence. There was an
assumed, neat bifurcation of identities and communities. As the
citizen lifted his eyes from the behaviour of politicans in the
provincial capital and turned towards Ottawa his provincial identity
was thought to be left behind as he partook of a Canadianism which
was different from and much more than the sum of its provincial
parts.
This Canadianism was always more of an English than a French
Canadian phenomenon. Indeed, it rested on a too easy equation of
Canadianism with the outlook and interests of the Anglophone side
of duality. Nevertheless, until the Quiet Revolution challenged the
centralization of power in the federal government, and by so doing
drew attention to the insensitivity of Ottawa as a national capital and
to the Anglophone bias of the national bureaucracy, the ethnic and
linguistic composition of the federal government was not a salient
issue. More general regional concerns were assumed to be
adequately melded into a composite national policy in the privacy of
caucus and Cabinet. From the depression until the early sixties,
therefore, the sensitivity of the central government to provincial
interests or linguistic dualism was not a major issue.
So profound was the subsequent transformation of basic
assumptions that by the seventies a new conventional wisdom
asserted that the major 'structural weakness' in the federal system
was the insensitivity of the institutions of the central government to
the territorial particularisms of which the country was allegedly
composed. Accordingly, one significant stream of proposals for
constitutional change aimed to modify the institutions of the central
government, such as the Senate, the Supreme Court, the
bureaucracy, and various boards and commissions, so that
provincial orientations would have a greater impact on policy
decisions. This approach, labelled intrastate federalism by Donald
Smiley', was often described as 'federalising' central institutions.
1. Donald Smiley, "The Structural Problem of Canadian Federalism," Canadian
Public Administration 14 (Fall 1971).
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A federal system viewed almost entirely in terms of the division
of powers and one viewed from the intrastate perspective of the
regional sensitivity or insensitivity of central institutions are very
different animals. In the former, regional interests are confined to
provincial containers. In the latter, they spill over into national
politics, pervade the institutional structure of the central govern-
ment, and in their most elaborate form threaten to transform the
centre into little more than a broker for the resolution of
interprovincial or interregional conflict.
The joining of these debates produced a dramatic confrontation
between rival conceptions of Canada. These conceptions structured
the debate on the Charter, the amending formula, the economic
union, official bilingualism, a reformed Senate, the position of
Quebec within or without Canada and other more peripheral issues.
The federal government position, after some hesitation, confu-
sion, and vacillation (and discounting the short Conservative
interlude,) was to reassert the traditional Ottawa approach. This
included the basic premise that Canada was more than the sum of its
parts, not just an aggregation of provincial and sectional interests.
Further, although sectional and provincial concerns might need to
be more accurately reflected in reformed central institutions -
including the bureaucracy - the federal government was to relate
directly to Canadians as individuals and as members of provincial
societies. To the extent that regional/provincial interests were to
receive greater recognition that was not to be done by making
provincial governments their spokesmen in Ottawa in areas clearly
subject to federal jurisdiction, but by enhancing the representative-
ness of federal government institutions. Also, given the new
penetrative capacities of the provincial state to draw the
communities and interests subject to provincial jurisdiction into
networks of dependence on provincial authority, further decentrali-
zation of power to the provinces was to be shunned. Finally, since
the positive state at the provincial level threatened to balkanize both
the economic and the political union, the federal government sought
institutional mechanisms to limit the ability of provincial
governments to create territorial diversities of citizen treatment
capable of subverting the overriding Canadianism dear to federal
policy-makers. Both the Charter and the federal desire to protect the
economic union sprang from the same basic objective of limiting
provincializing tendencies.
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In essence, the federal strategy was one of contestation with
provincial definitions of the country which threatened to undermine
the centrality of the federal government in citizens' eyes. There was
nothing novel about this approach. There has been a consistent,
natural, almost inevitable federal tendency to protect and exalt the
national community, the national identity, and the national interest
whenever they are threatened by provincial fragmentation, even if
the latter reflects the entirely legitimate use of provincial powers. In
areas central to its evolving vision of Canada, the central
government has recurrently tried to diminish the capacities of
provincial governments to create provincial diversities of citizen
treatment. For Ottawa to so act is like breathing, requiring no
second thoughts as to purpose, but only careful calculation as to
means and timing.
This policy tendency was inherent in the very meaning of
Confederation with its creation of a central government which took
possession of the key jurisdictional areas of the former colonies.
The centralized federalism of 1867 was to provide a framework
within which growing sentiments of loyalty and identification with
the new central government would flow from the exercise of its
authority. The subsequent national policy was a set of policy
instruments designed to integrate the separate societies and
economies of the new country around a national transportation
system and tariff which, along with massive immigration to the
west, would tie the country together in networks of interdepen-
dence.
After the Rowell-Sirois Report and the onset of the Second World
War Ottawa moved to eliminate the clashing federal provincial tax
jungle of the thirties by preemptively occupying the direct tax field
in return for payments to provincial governments. Ottawa took over
unemployment insurance in 1940, after securing a constitutional
amendment, and followed this in 1951, by gaining the constitutional
authority to establish its own old age pension program, followed by
another tidying up amendment in 1964 which added supplementary
benefits such as survivors' and disability benefits to Ottawa's
constitutionally legitimate base of legislative authority. The latter
were all part of a basic drive to give the federal government
leadership in the creation of the Canadian welfare state, even
although the basic jurisdictional authority for most of its component
parts rested with the provinces. The federal government sought to
minimize the centrifugal consequences of predominant provincial
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responsibility in the welfare area by purchasing, with conditional
grants, a degree of uniformity which otherwise would not have
prevailed, at the cost of a de facto weakening of provincial
autonomy. These centralizing initiatives were legally based on the
use of the spending power. Politically they were based on the
federal desire to provide a uniform base of welfare entitlements for
Canadians regardless of province of residence. The consistent thrust
of federal policy was to reduce the barriers to citizen mobility by
eliminating the cost to citizens of crossing provincial boundaries.
In 1960 the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights represented a further
attempt to mould a Canadian citizenry by providing an equal floor
of rights for Canadians for matters in federal jurisdiction. This was
followed by the official Languages Act of 1969, a straightforward
effort to legitimate the central government for French-speaking
citizens in the face of a threatening province-based Quebec
nationalism.
To look back at these major initiatives is to see a strong thread of
basic purpose: the ever renewed federal effort to proceed
incrementally to the evolutionary creation of the symbolic and
practical attributes of a single Canadian citizenship. Federal policy
in the recent constitutional review process was the contemporary
expression of this historic and traditional federal government effort
to strengthen the national community and to resist the provincializa-
tion of the Canadian people.
Since 1960 a counter, provincializing trend, concurrent with the
more recent federal efforts, reflected a new aggressiveness of
provincial governments. A province-building phenomenon born not
only of the emergence of a positive state-centered nationalism in
Quebec, but also of the ambitions of various other provincial
governments, saw the latter strengthen their hold on their societies
and economies, pulling their citizenry to the provincial sources of
authority, discretion and power.
The significance of the province-building phenomenon in
general, and in its particular Quebec nationalist expression, was
found not simply in the contest of power between the federal
government and the provinces which it precipitated. More important
was the development of a counter ideology to centralism. As the
Smallwoods were replaced by the Peckfords, the Mannings by the
Lougheeds, Duplessis by the Lesages and the Lvesques, and elder
Bennetts by younger Bennetts, the emergent realities of provincial
power came to be clothed in definitions of the country which
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emphasized provincial governments at the expense of the national
government, and provincial communities and identities at the
expense of the national community and the national identity. This
provincializing perspective saw Canada more as an aggregation of
provincial communities for whom provincial governments were the
natural spokesmen, rather than seeing such communities merged
and diluted in the larger encompassing and integrating national
community responsive to the leadership of a dominant central
government. By the late seventies the Pepin-Robarts Task Force
described Canada primarily in terms of dualism and regionalism,
while the first Conservative Prime Minister in nearly two decades
viewed Canada as a vaguely defined community of communities.
To the Parti Qu~b6cois the federal government was simply
illegitimate. To Peckford, Ottawa was the child of the provinces. To
Lougheed it was an alien, exploiting centre seeking to deprive
Alberta of its new found wealth.
By the time of the constitutional discussions of 1980-81 platform
rhetoric had passed over into constitutional demands for a
reconstruction of Canada based on these new provincial self images.
The constitutional struggle, therefore, was a contest between
competing definitions of Canada which carried in their wake the
potential restructuring of the psyche of Canadians. It was for
possession of our souls that the contending governments fought.
The competing actors sought not only a practical but a symbolic
reconstruction of the Canadian constitutional system - a
reconstruction designed over the long haul to transform our
identities and perceptions and to direct our definitions of who we are
and what Canada was all about in ways compatible with the new
federalism they were bent on constructing, or in the case of the Parti
Qu~b6cois, destroying.
The basic federal objective was to nationalize the environment
from which the citizenry received its cues so that the future balance
of federal-provincial loyalties and identities would shift to the
advantage of the central government. The basic objective of the
more aggressive members of the provincial 'Gang of Eight' was to
do the reverse. We, the citizenry caught in the middle of this
constitutional Wimbledon, were mostly audience, occasionally
players, and always uneasily aware that our future as a people was
attached to the trophy the ultimate winner would triumphantly hold
aloft.
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IV. The Amending Formula and the Charter:
Competing Conceptions of Community
The process by which the recent constitutional settlement was
reached has been described elsewhere. The settlement itself was not
a triumph for any of the more extreme views contending for
acceptance. Sovereignty-association was, of course, repudiated by
the Quebec electorate. The more provincialist versions of desired
futures were basically thwarted, while the centralizing federal
patriation package of 1980-81 was cast aside by the perceived need
to obtain extensive provincial government support before proceed-
ing to Westminster for the last time.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the constitutional settlement speaks
with divergent voices about the nature of the Canada to which it is to
apply and which it is to help create. Its contradictions reflect the
clash and subsequent compromise between profoundly antithetical
views about Canada. These contradictions are embedded in the
Charter and the amending formula, the two major institutional
modifications to emerge from our recent protracted struggle.
An intimate linkage between institutional advocacy and concep-
tions of community pervaded the constitutional debates. While this
is self-evident for sovereignty-association with its explicit purpose
of sundering the Canadian community to the end of creating a new
Qu~b~cois nation, it is no less applicable for the other major choices
which confronted constitution makers.
The preferred federal amending formula in the unilateralism
package was clearly designed to diminish the role of provincial
governments in amending procedures, exalt the role of the people
with their new referendum capacity, and generally to allow the
national will to override recalcitrant provincial wills.
The federal formula was based on a four region Canada, the
West, Ontario, Quebec, and the Atlantic provinces and was so
constructed that an amendment could pass as long as it had the
support of the governments of Ontario and Quebec, governments of
any two Atlantic and any two Western provinces, and the federal
government. Clearly such a formula did not respect the sovereignty
of the provinces. Not only, therefore, was it a relatively flexible
formula but it was also a decisive manifestation of a federal desire to
give institutional expression to a national will triumphing over (up
to four) recalcitrant provincial governments.
The diminished status which Ottawa sought to accord provincial
governments was even more emphatically present in a supplemen-
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tary amending provision. If the requisite provincial government
agreement was not obtained, the federal government could call a
national referendum allowing a national voting majority, providing
certain regional criteria for support were met, to bypass the
opposition, in the extreme case, of all ten provincial governments.
This was potentially an immensely significant symbolic and
practical redefinition of the constituent parts of the Canadian federal
polity. It located ultimate sovereignty in an alliance between the
federal government and national referendum electorates conceiva-
bly responding to amending proposals mainly of interest to the
federal government and answering questions worded by federal
officials. It was an incredibly ambitious attempt to strengthen the
central government, elevate the status of the people as constitutional
actors, and reduce provincial governments to the status of initial,
but no longer final spokesmen for provincial interests. The
fundamental thrust of the proposal was nation-building, if need be,
at the expense of provincial governments whose powers would
henceforth be held on sufferance. The federal government, of
course, preserved its own veto and had the exclusive power to
activate the process, so there was no way in which it could be a
loser.
In marked contrast, the Alberta amending formula, and the eight
province Constitutional Accord based on it, was a protective
package directed to making each province, for which the exclusive
spokesman was to be its government, a fortress of rights immune to
nationalizing and centralizing pressures which any provincial
government wished to resist. The Alberta formula and the
Constitutional Accord were based on the triumph of province over
region. Both were based on the equality of the provinces and their
sovereignty. The formula explicitly repudiated all concepts of
regions and regional majorities, and denied power to a national
majority, whether composed of governments or voters, to impose its
will on a recalcitrant provincial government. Consequently, it
expressed a view of Canada as an aggregation of provincial
communities and provincial governments, with the latter endowed
with indefeasible rights in perpetuity to the jurisdictional powers
they possessed.
The ingenuity of the formula was in its combination of flexibility
- seven provinces with 50% of the population being sufficient to
pass an amendment - with provincial protection. The Accord
allowed up to three provinces to opt out of amendments "derogating
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from the legislative powers, the proprietary rights, or any other
rights or privileges of the Legislature or government of a province,"
and required the federal government to "provide reasonable
compensation to the governments of such provinces." What was
sacrificed in the Accord was the nation-wide uniform appliction of
future amendments. The integrity of the national community was to
be sacrificed to preserve the integrity of the component provincial
parts.
The Charter and the provincial opposition to it were also based
on conceptions of community. From one perspective the con-
troversy over the Charter was simply a straightforward debate over
the best way to protect rights, between supporters of a leadership
role for the judiciary enforcing an entrenched Charter, and
supporters of leaving responsibility in the hands of parliamentarians
who could respond flexibly to unpredictable future situations.
However, the real constitutional significance of the Charter
becomes clearer when it is noted that those political actors who
defended the supremacy of legislatures against an encroaching role
of the courts were spokesmen for provincial governments. Nothing
was more revealing of the situational determinants of policy
position than the fact that, as discussion of the Charter moved back
and forth between the federal parliamentary public arena and First
Ministers' Conferences, it was alternately strengthened and
weakened. From the perspective of provincial governments in the
'Gang of Eight' the Charter was seen not as an instrument which
removed power impartially from both levels of government on
behalf of the people, but as a tool for the achievement of federal
government objectives at the expense of provincial governments.
Inevitably, the Charter's goal of ensuring that Canadians had a
category of rights immune from governmental interference at either
level would restrict the possibility of provincial legislative
experimentation with its resultant creation of diversities coincident
with provincial boundaries. It was this balkanization of rights which
Ottawa sought to prevent, and which paralleled its desire to prevent
the balkanization of the economic union. The opposing provinces
fought not only to preserve their capacity for legislative
experimentation, including the creation of distinctive bundles of
provincial rights for their citizens, but Quebec, Alberta and
Saskatchewan were also strongly opposed to the enhancement of
judicial power the Charter would necessarily bring in its wake.
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They saw, or professed to see, the Supreme Court not as an
impartial umpire but an instrument of centralization.
The resolution of these contradictory positions on the Charter and
the amending formula required compromises on both sides. The
extent and direction of change were dictated by the fact that
Ottawa's commitment to the Charter was stronger than its
commitment to its amending formula. The 'Gang of Eight' by
contrast was more committed to its amending formula than it was
opposed to the Charter. Consequently, the final week of bargaining
was devoted to a provincializing of the Charter and a limited
nationalizing of the Constitutional Accord amending formula. The
latter contained an opting out clause, which was weakened by
Ottawa's insistence that the clause requiring financial compensation
to opting out provinces be removed (later partly reinstated with
respect to education and cultural matters to placate Quebec.) The
Charter was weakened by the insertion of a non-obstante clause with
respect to specified sections of the Charter. Section 33 allows
Parliament or any provincial legislature to prevent the application of
the Charter provisions dealing with Fundamental Freedoms, Legal
Rights, and Equality Rights to any federal or provincial Act or
provision of an Act, for up to five years, which can be extended for
additional five year periods by re-enacting legislation.
Since the two major components of the constitutional settlement,
the Charter and the amending formula, derive respectively from
nationalist and provincialist positions, only partly modified by
concessions to the other side, it is not surprising that the overall
philosophic consistency of the constitutional settlement in which
they co-exist is negligible. Either the Alberta amending formula and
no Charter, or the federal amending formula and a strong Charter
lacking a non-obstante clause would have been internally consistent
in their basic assumptions about the nature of community in
Canada. The constitutional settlement which combines a
nationalizing Charter and a provincializing amending formula is a
contradiction posing as a compromise.
V. Was the Game Worth The Candle?
"But what good came of it last?" quoth little Peterkin: "Why that I
cannot tell," said he, "but 'twas a famous victory."
Robert Southey is not around to pass his judgement on the
Canadian version of the Battle of Blenheim. Little Peterkin's
question, however, deserves an answer.
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1. The Constitutional Exercise as a Collective Experience
A constitution is not just a bundle of machinery, a big tinker toy
with substitutable parts facilitating easy assembling and dismantl-
ing. It is also a body of understandings, norms, and identities of
those who live the ongoing constitutional life of the country. From
this perspective, we are all part of the constitution, and the
evolution of our inner life has a constitutional component and
significance. Although I cannot provide rigorous proof, I can at
least plausibly argue that the world of inner meanings and
understandings which we carry in our heads, and which is no less
important than the institutional framework, was profoundly
transformed with major consequences for our constitutional future.
It is not sufficient, therefore, to look outwards to federalism and
parliamentary government as if the skin of our bodies were a shell
protecting our inner selves from major changes in the functioning of
institutions. We must also look inwards to the rearrangement of our
constitutional psyches and assumptions, recognizing always that the
overt world of constitutional machinery and our inner private worlds
of meanings are connected, if not always harmoniously.
From this vantage point, the constitutional process produced
more constitutional change than appears in the formal amendments.
In its largest sense the constitution is a collective experience, and a
body of evolving understandings and assumptions which interacts
with that experience. In this expanded sense there was significant,
albeit elusive, constitutional change which was not always
deliberately sought but emerged as a by-product of the pursuit of
other purposes.
The harrowing constitutional process of recent decades changed
our understanding of our political system, modified our civic
identities, and adjusted our overall relationship to our constitutional
arrangments. We have been simultaneously made aware of the
fragility of our constitutional system, with its possible breakup only
narrowly averted, and of the tremendous difficulty of fundamental,
far-reaching reform despite the titanic efforts of strong-willed
leaders.
The taken-for-granted quality of the constitution characteristic of
the immediate post World War II decades and earlier periods has
been eroded. We now know that our political identity, our sense of
community, and the balance of our federal and provincial loyalties
are all subject to potential modification by institutional change.
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Even although we experienced extreme difficulties in generating
formal change, the recognition that political systems can represent
acts of choice is now much more wide-spread. We have come to
agree with Renan, often quoted by Trudeau, that a nation is a
plebiscite of every day. While this was most strikingly evident in
Quebec with its traumatic referendum experience, there was a
concurrent Canada-wide implicit on-going referendum through
which the entire country passed.
English Canadians were made aware that the comfortable frame
of placid existence of the post-war King and St-Laurent years lacked
the durability and stability that seemed to tinge it with eternity. As
the transformations of Quebec politics proceeded through the
post-Duplessis years to the installation of an ind~pendentiste
government in 1976, followed by four years of constitutional cold
war culminating in the 1980 referendum, those of us who lived
outside of Quebec recognized that the Canada we knew might pass
away, that we might be Pakistainized against our will. Further, this
potential act of separation was driven by an internal dialectic in
Quebec, which left those of us living elsewhere only the status of
observers. We sat before our television screens and watched our
collective Canadian future decided elsewhere. The Parti Qu6b6cois
goal of destroying the Canadianism of Quebeckers would, as a
by-product, destroy the Canadianism of the rest of us.
We even lacked an acceptable name for that new political self
which might, unsought, have been thrust upon us. We were
variously dignified by the label 'the rest of Canada,' or 'Canada
without Quebec,' descriptions which did not make our hearts sing.
Further than that, it was not clear that Canada without Quebec
would continue as a single political entity. In an era of strident
provincialism, with an independent Quebec separating east from
west, and given the hypothesis of a shattered Ottawa which would
follow Quebec's departure, it required little paranoia to see the
future of Canada without Quebec as subject to a further
fragmentation into a gaggle of provinces posing as states.
For Qu6b6cois the experience was very different. From 1976 to
1980 the political dynamism and direction of events seemed to be
concentrated in Quebec. Here the great drama of Quebec's future,
and therefore of Canada's, was played out. The interaction of the
heady wine of nationalism and the charismatic leadership of Ren6
Lvesque produced the seemingly incontrovertible truism that
Quebec's future would be somewhere in the spectrum from Quebec
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independence to a position within a revised Canadian federalism
significantly more elevated than existing provincial status.
The political logic which turned English Canada into spectators
of unfolding events in Quebec led Quebeckers to believe that at least
the first act in the political reconstruction of Canadian federalism
was theirs alone to make in an atmosphere of nationalist
introspection. Provincial leaders outside of Quebec participated
tentatively and gingerly, if at all, in the Quebec referendum debate,
thus providing implicit support for the thesis that they could only
choose between being outsiders or intruders in a process designed to
break up their country. Even Prime Minister Trudeau limited his
major interventions to four speeches - Although Quebec members
of the federal cabinet were quite active - with the command of the
"no" forces being handled by the Quebec provincial Liberal leader,
Claude Ryan.
The Parti Qudbdcois message was clear, that what was required
was a great act of national will, after which Ottawa - the existence
of the other provinces was scarcely noted - would bargain with a
triumphant nationalist elite with a mandate to negotiate sovereignty
association. And yet when it was all over, the result was otherwise.
Not only was sovereignty association defeated in the referendum,
but the very act of pursuing it, coupled with the surprising
re-election of the Parti Qu6bdcois in the Spring of 1981 (which kept
the elaborate constitutional demands of the Quebec Liberals for
renewed federalism off the bargaining table,) deprived Quebec of
effective representation in the constitutional process which followed
the referendum. A massive psychological commitment to mobiliz-
ing nationalist forces behind the goals of a hoped-for independent
state precluded the simultaneous preparation of a sophisticated
fall-back position of a renewed federalism. The Parti Qu6bdcois
dilemma rested on the inability to combine passion for their first
choice with a carefully calculated strategy for a distant second
choice. Admission of the possibility that the renewal of a decrepit
federalism had to be prepared for was to admit the possibility of
losing, which was politically out of the question.
Thus in the same way that Canada outside of Quebec would have
been unprepared to think of itself as a coherent entity bargaining
with a victorious Parti Qu6bdcois government, the latter was
unprepared for the federalist counter-offensive when Pierre Trudeau
turned out to be the real winner of a referendum designed to break
up the country over which he was Prime Minister. Quebec, because
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of the Parti Qu6b6cois re-election, was unprepared for what
happened. For the rest of us, by a stroke of luck, our
unpreparedness was innocuous as it applied to a future which did
not happen - the post-referendum situation which would have
followed a 'yes' vote.
All Canadians, therefore, live in the aftermath of great political
events - of aspirations dashed - of certainties eroded - of
strategies which backfired - of too easy assumptions that the world
north of the 49th parallel could easily be channelled in the direction
of idealistic purposes. We have been alternately frightened by
threatened changes we did not seek, enraptured by constitutional
visions seemingly within our grasp, and ultimately seared by the
recognition of potentialities which continued to elude us.
The sense of loss, of pain, and of incredulity at the hardness of
the world was given bitter lament by Claude Morin after the
exclusion of Quebec from the agreement between Ottawa and the
other nine provinces.
An undeniable fact remains - we are faced with a situation
where a (federal) government which is majority English-
speaking, associated with nine English-speaking provincial
governments, will ask another English speaking government in
London to reduce without its consent the integrity and authority
of the only French-speaking government in North America. For
18 years now . . . I have been directly involved in the
constitutional debate. At no time did I ever think Quebec would
end up in the deplorable and painful situation in which we find
ourselves today.
2
His sentiments, if not his words, would have been uttered by a
spokesman for the rest of Canada had the results of the referendum
ballot been reversed.
It may be poetic exaggeration to say that we have all been
indelibly marked by these revelations of our collective and
individual impotence, to suggest that we now know that our
immunity from the normal tribulations of our planetary colleagues
accustomed to recurrent upheavals was, and always will be
contingent. I think otherwise. We have all felt the shaking of the
earth, the memory of which will not quickly depart.
We have seen the ruthlessness of democratic politics when the
stakes are high. We will not easily forget that major constitutional
change is not a parlour game for the faint of heart. As our future was
2. Vancouver Sun, March 7, 1981
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played out it was made brutally clear that constitutions and changes
in them are instruments to fashion and to destroy peoples, and that
as citizens and even as leaders we have only a limited capacity to
move our little Canadian world in preferred directions, or prevent its
movement in directions of which we disapprove. A few short years
ago many of us thought otherwise.
Some recent essays of Albert 0. Hirschman, 3 organized around
the general theme of the role of disappointment in private and public
life, are relevant here. Hirschman reminds us of the oscillation in
human affairs wherein major efforts which fail produce a counter
reaction. Exhausted we depart the field of failure and retire to lick
our wounds. Thus many who have visited their hopes on the public
sphere to improve the political management of our collective
existence are induced by disappointment to retreat to family, to the
private life, to cultivating their garden. But the taste of victory, too,
can be flat and insipid, for the victors seldom win completely,
wholly, and convincingly. Even if they do the promised land
remains elusive and still beyond their grasp.
So, we may expect a temporary abatement of our constitutional
introspection. The subjects which were temporarily crowded off our
public agenda by the constitutional exercise have returned. They
combine with the changed people we have become, because of what
we have been through, to move us on to other issues and to a new
balance between our public and our private selves. We approach
those other issues against the historical backdrop of a constitutional
experience which may be as significant as memory, and hence as
control; as was the depression experience of the thirties to a
previous generation.
2. Constitutionalism and Democracy
Quite independently, therefore, of the formal changes in the
constitution, but rather reflecting the experiences we have lived
through, we have become in subtle ways a new political people.
Since the constitutional order does not exist in isolation from the
evolving nature of its citizenry, this too is a constitutional change in
its own way, albeit one difficult to measure and too easy to
underestimate.
3. Albert 0. Hirschman, Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action
(Princeton, N.J.; 1982)
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The changes in our knowledge, in our political dispositions, and
in the feeling side of our political selves do not exhaust the
constitutional transformations we have gone through as citizens. A
larger question demands an answer which it is difficult to give. Has
the experience and its outcome enhanced that elusive quality of
constitutionalism on which the most highly developed political
systems depend for the moral quality, civility, and tolerance in the
political behaviour of leaders and citizens?
A well functioning constitution is, among other things, an
overarching normative order which constrains and ennobles the
major actors by relating their roles to the political traditions,
contemporary meanings, and future goals of the overall system.
Such a normative order strains towards coherence and equilibrium,
and is closely connected with ideas of legitimacy. It is the existence
of such a normative order whose moral dictates restrain and guide
both citizens and leaders that is the essence of constitutionalism.
From this perspective, institutions are not simply pieces of
machinery sustained by vested interests, but the embodiment of
particular values which in the aggregate define a political system in
terms of procedures and goals. Thus to rearrange the constitutional
machinery of the state, as we have just done, is to rearrange the
normative system of the polity, change the cues transmitted to
political actors at both elite and mass levels, and in some cases to
adjust the boundaries of political community and the content of
political identity.
The capacity of the Canadian state to clothe itself in the garments
of constitutionalism is unclear. We no longer have, and cannot
return to, a liberal state ruling benignly in a limited fashion, asking
little of its citizens and giving little in return. The modern Canadian
state intertwines with society and economy in a multitude of ways.
While this binds citizens and interests to the state in networks of
benefits and obligations, it simultaneously enhances the state's
dependence on the citizenry for the successful pursuit of public
purposes.
Every increase in state-society interactions increases the
requirement for the state to be sensitive, discriminating and caring.
Otherwise a growing number of abrasive interactions between state,
society and economy can only work to the disadvantage of a
constitutionalism which depends on mutual respect.
As is often the case, the need for a more comprehensive, fuller
and subtle expression of a particular value in human affairs emerges
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in inauspicious circumstances. So it is with the contemporary
democratic state. It is a sprawling, diffuse, uncoordinated leviathan
whose very nature simultaneously requires and hinders that more
developed sense of constitutionalism which is now necessary to
keep the genie we have let out of the bottle amenable to our wishes.
The centrifugal nature of the operation of the modern state produces
a proliferation of uncoordinated interactions with the citizenry. The
absence of an effective directing core of power renders the efficacy
of responsible government, competing parties, universal suffrage,
and so on, no longer adequate to keep the state our servant.
In that reciprocal interdependence between state and society the
state, as well as society, is imperilled if it comes to be judged as an
inefficient, amoral actor. Democratic capitalist welfare states are
challenged by the global interdependence of the modern condition
in which capital, ideas, and to a lesser but still significant extent, the
citizenry are mobile. The citizens are bombarded with ideas and
external models of private and public, individual and collective
behaviour which take them out of the protective cocoon of an
insulated existence. Many of these citizens are newcomers, immune
to the bonds of tradition which help to sustain loyalties in the longer
established. Many are potential emigrants prepared to vote with
their feet if the possibility of pursuing life goals seems more fruitful
elsewhere.
In other words, the citizens' relationship to the political
authorities which govern them is increasingly conditional. It is not
only our economy which has been internationalized but also our
society, as the composition of our metropolitan centres testifies.
The state's relations to its citizens could, of course, become
analogous to a great railway station in which all are passengers
coming and going. No state, however, is likely to adopt this
approach to a citizenry whose potential mobility is threatening to
political authorities whose domain is fixed by geography.
The stratagems open to the state are various, but essentially they
are reduced to the simple thesis that the state has to make its
occupation of a particular corner of the world more attractive than
other beckoning alternatives. The democratic state commences this
task with certain advantages. Mobility is not costless. Further, the
instruments of socialization bias the citizen in favour of the political
order in which he lives. The more elaborate and complete the
version of citizenship which exists in a given state the more the
citizen will identify with the state and be reluctant to leave it. In
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Hirschman's terms, the state must strengthen the mechanisms of
voice and the sentiments of loyalty to limit resort to the mechanisms
of exit.
From this perspective the recent constitutional settlement is a
mixed blessing. The obtaining of a settlement, almost any
settlement, was a positive good, since the total failure of such a
massive effort at renewal would have been profoundly dispiriting.
However, the process itself, with its incivilities, threats, and
competitive brinksmanship was deeply disillusioning and dishear-
tening. Frequent repetition of such intergovernmental acrimony
undermines the citizens' confidence in political authority and
reduces the hold of the state on the affections of its subjects.
Nothing in the recent constitutional agreement addressed that
profound weakness of our intergovernmental system, except the
amending formula, which at least provides us with rules for that
limited class of future intergovernmental controversies focussing on
amendments. Another possible contribution lies in the constraining
effect of the memories of future political leaders of that disfiguring
episode of final bargaining in which our rights were publicly
bartered and swapped like sides of mutton. These will not be
enough. The world of executive federalism, especially at the
summit, still awaits the devising of rules and norms capable of
civilizing the intergovernmental process.
Elsewhere, however, there were some hopeful portents in our
recent collective constitutional trauma. When brought together they
are surprisingly positive for a regeneration of constitutionalism
which will contribute to keeping government responsible,
strengthening the Canadian community, and enhancing loyalty by
elaborating the meaning and practice of citizenship.
Both in terms of its process and its outcome the constitutional
exercise strengthened the democratic component in Canadian
constitutionalism and moved partially in the direction of vesting
sovereignty in the people. This is not the standard interpretation of
the process which has been widely castigated by many critics
(myself included) for its dominance and manipulation by elites.
However, to pull some of the scattered threads together is to
glimpse another deeper process at work, pregnant with possibilities
for an increasing public role in the Canadian constitutional order.
The Quebec referendum is instructive here. Implicit in that daring
exercise was the assumption that such a significant change in
political status as a move to sovereignty association could only be
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legitimized by a popular majority. Further, not only was the
referendum itself an exercise in plebiscitary democracy, but the
referendum question made it clear that any possible change in
constitutional status as a result of bargaining, consequent on a
government receipt of a positive mandate, would itself have to be
supported in a second referendum.
A further instructive lesson of the Quebec referendum was the
apparent willingness of Canadians elsewhere to allow the peaceful
disintegration of the Canadian state as a consequence of a decisive
affirmative vote in a free and fair referendum contest. Admittedly,
this was stated more by indirection than explicitly by the federal
government. Nevertheless, the almost universal assumption that
force should not be employed to keep a recalcitrant Quebec majority
in the federation was impressive testimony to the civility and
tolerance of a society prepared to allow its own peaceful
dismantling. In a constitutional sense this contributes to the norm
that the Canadian political system is ultimately based on the freely
given consent of its citizenry.
Further indications of a democratizing process can be found in the
major impact of citizens' groups on the work of the Joint Committee
of the Senate and the House of Commons, and the very effective
application of mass political pressure by aboriginal groups and
women for the restoration of rights removed in closed intergovern-
mental bargaining to placate some of the provincial Premiers.
An additional indication of a democratizing process was the
elimination of an absolute veto for the Senate in constitutional
amendments - an elimination which has paved the way for a
reformed Senate more compatible with contemporary assumptions
about the necessity for a popular base for political office holders
possessed of discretion. Early anticipations of the democratizing
consequences of this elimination of a Senate veto capacity are found
in the recent government paper on Senate reform supporting
elections, and the probability that the Special Joint Committee on
Senate reform will propose some version of an elected upper house.
More generally, not only was the elite domination of the
constitutional process subject to extensive criticism, but there was a
developing intellectual current in the federal government, and in
academic commentary, to view the people as the ultimate arbiter
when an impasse is reached between governments on constitutional
issues. Thus the federal government was seriously tempted to
bypass the intergovernmental mechanisms of executive federalism
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and resort to the people at various stages in the recent constitutional
discussions.
The various federal referendum initiatives 4 were a mix of
strategic considerations, governmental self-interest and belief in
the sovereignty of the people. The fact remains that federal
politicians were willing to consider sacrificing elite dominance of
the intergovernmental constitutional process by a profound
redefinition of the basis of ultimate authority in the Canadian
constitutional system.
Cynicism about federal government motives is somewhat allayed
by the reiterated assertions of Prime Minister Trudeau of the
importance of the national will as the ultimate basis of a
well-functioning constitutional order. Strategically, the federal
government's position rested on the belief that there was a national
community waiting to be tapped by Ottawa for nation-building
purposes, in defiance of the centrifugal tendencies in the federal
system which resulted from the monopoly position of provincial
governments as spokesmen for provincial communities.
With the federal government's proposed amending formula,
Trudeau sought to change the constitution from being a compact
among governments to being a compact between the people and the
national government, with provincial governments reduced to
ineffective bystanders if they stood in the way of that alliance. In
magnitude, the proposed change was almost as profound as the
reconstruction of political and governmental power north of the 49th
parallel sought by the Parti Qu6b6cois. That the referendum
amending process might have been infrequently employed would
have been less significant than the rearrangement of our
constitutional norms which its simple existence would have brought
in its wake.
Several other aspects of the constitutional process and its
outcome were congruent with the popular role envisaged by the
federal government. The rhetorical contrast in the "people versus
4. In the final round of hectic bargaining the federal government threw out the
tantalizing possibility that a national referendum might be employed to break the
intergovernmental deadlock. Also, as noted above (pp. 134 & 135), the federal
amending formula in the unilaterism package contained a referendum option.
Further, if intergovernmental agreement was not possible on an amending formula,
and if several conditions were met, the electorate would be given the choice by
referendum to determine whether a federal government formula, or a competing
formula supported by seven provinces with 80 percent of the population, should
govern future amendments.
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powers" definition of the issues at stake in federal-provincial
constitutional bargaining, with Ottawa's proposals designated as a
people's package and the 'Gang of Eight' characterized as only
interested in jurisdictional power aggrandisement, was a shrewd,
and relatively successful propaganda ploy to portray the demands of
the opposing provincial governments as only the squalid interests of
provincial governments as only the squalid intersts of provincial
government elites. This was perhaps a natural perspective for
Ottawa - to portray the dissenting provinces as more interested in
fish than the rights of the people - but its significance resides in the
fact that it was effective. The only counter-claim of the opposing
provinces was to assert that their demands were also people
demands, and only fortuitously connected with what looked like a
self-interested focus on the division of powers or a greater
provincial government input into the institutions of the central
government.
It may be that these democratizing tendencies and initiatives will
turn out to be only ephemeral aberrations from the elitism
characteristic of Canadian politics. On the other hand, the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms is now part of our constitutional
landscape. Its basic consequence is to give constitutional legitimacy
in our political discourse to the language of rights residing in the
people. The Charter will not be an unmixed blessing. If it takes
hold, it may contribute to an aggressive rights-conscious indi-
vidualism hostile to fraternity and solidarity. Further, the
affirmative action sanctioned and even invited by the Charter may
engender disruptive group antagonism.
On the other hand, in the modem world Charters and Bills of
Rights are useful mechanisms to attach the citizenry to the state and
to generate loyalty both by their symbolism and the capacity to
redress grievances which they provide. Further, the citizens of a
fragmented society may achieve an integrating collective sense of
themselves from their common possession of rights and the
availability of a common language of political discourse.
Finally, a society which is strongly rights-conscious is likely to
step up demands for participation. This, of course, can be
state-threatening. However, if it is the case that constitutionalism in
the modern era demands more of governments and more of citizens
at the same time, a participant, rights-conscious citizenry is a
necessary, if not sufficient condition for a well-functioning
constitutional order.
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If the possibilities opened up by these democratizing tendencies
are to be translated into fact, the federal and provincial governments
of the country must facilitate further democratic input. Elitism and
hierarchy are less compatible with the people we have become than
the people we were. A failure to respond will leave us worse off, for
our expectations have been raised, and the Charter will, in all
probability, not let them die.
It will not be easy to reconcile the role of the bureaucracy, the
elitism of cabinet government and a more democratic polity. Utopia
is not on our agenda. Incremental moves in the right direction are all
that can reasonably be expected. Fortunately, if this analysis is
correct, the functional requirements of the state for legitimacy and
efficacy and the democratic value of participation are congruent. In
this case, the recognition of necessity is not a burden to be borne,
but an opportunity to be grasped. At least at the margins and for
once we are not in a zero-sum game.
In the absence of Robert Southey to answer little Peterkin's
question of "What good came of it at last?" I cannot provide a
ringing answer. However, the Charter and the democratizing
tendencies described above are surely hopeful signs. They may help
to bind us together by legitimising the political process through
which we resolve claims on each other. The holding of rights in
common may help overcome the multiple fragmentations of
community described earlier. Further, a rights-conscious commun-
ity may reduce the distance between the governed and the
governors, and may contribute to more sensitive government. We
may be disappointed, but we have a chance.
Was, then, the constitutional game worth the candle? Throwing
academic caution to the winds, I respond with a resounding
"Maybe!"
